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Preface
South Africa is on the threshold of a completely new constitutional dispen­
sation. After many years of implicit or explicit apartheid, the new goals are 
now a non-racial democracy, adequate constitutional rights for all South 
Africans and a justiciable bill of rights.
A major challenge in the negotiation process is to find a way of 
unlocking the potential of the country's people and, at the same time, 
giving adequate protection and peace of mind on a non-ethnic basis to the 
different language groups.
Against this general background, a number of themes relating to 
language and the law are examined in the present volume:
• language and empowerment
• the handling of language disputes
• the constitutional status of languages
• the nature of language rights
• the relationship between constitutional clauses and legal rights
• other laws governing the use of language in the public and business 
sectors
• the role of language in the courtroom
• the accessibility of the language of the law
Experts from different parts of the world (Africa, the Americas, Eu­
rope and the East) helped analyse the complex relationship between 
language, law and political dynamics as reflected in this publication, 
covering events up to 1992. The volume includes most of the papers read 
at the Third International Conference on Language Law, held in Pretoria 
between 27 and 30 April 1992. The conference was a joint endeavour by the 
International Academy of Language Law, the Human Sciences Research 
Council and the University of Pretoria. The summaries at the end of the 
volume contain references to conference contributions and discussions not 
published as chapters in the publication.
VII
This volume reflects a substantial step forward in the discourse of the 
past five years or so on a language dispensation for South Africa. This 
progress can largely be ascribed to the deep interest shown by many of the 
participants in the conference in human dignity, tolerance and language 
differences.
This volume of papers is being published because of the stated 
interest of a wide spectrum of prospective readers. The publication will be 
useful too for those working in the areas of law, political science, socio­
linguistics, language planning, translation and interpreting. It is a book 
intended for students, academics, decision-makers and laymen who have 
an interest in the interface of language and law.
Karel Prinsloo 
Yvo Peelers 
Joseph Turi 
Christo van Rensburg
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IINTRODUCTION
Opening statement by the 
Mayor of Pretoria
■ II
i l l
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Advocate J. H. Leach
ivivlvw-:
It is indeed a privilege to welcome you to our beautiful city, generally 
known as the Jacaranda City. It is especially an honour for me as a 
law-trained person myself to attend the opening of this Third International 
Conference on Language Law, as I regard it a subject of current interest in 
South Africa.
Pretoria can be considered a judicial city at large, as it educates a large 
number of the country's future lawyers and advocates at its various 
educational institutions. Three universities, namely the University of 
South Africa, one of the largest correspondence universities in the world, 
the University of Pretoria, the largest residential university in the country, 
and Vista University with its 27 000 students, all have law faculties. Law 
courses are also presented at technicons and similar institutions in Preto­
ria.
This city also boasts the headquarters of many of the judicial organi­
sations in South Africa, such as the Association of Law Societies of the 
RSA, the Transvaal Law Society and Lawyers for Human Rights, to name 
but a few. There are also various courts of law in this dty, among others 
the first family court in South Africa.
Pretoria, Atteridgeville and Mamelodi have approximately one mil­
lion inhabitants and this figure increases annually. This large number of 
people speak up to 11 different languages. To provide these people with 
legal advice the 219 registered advocates and 3 892 lawyers in Pretoria 
therefore have an enormous task to perform.
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It is appropriate that you decided to hold this conference in the 
administrative capital of our country as it is here that many of our 
country's laws are drafted. The timing of your conference is equally 
appropriate, as the questions of language, the law and the language law 
in South Africa have led to much debate in the past two years, especially 
when the government of Namibia decided to make English the only 
official language in Namibia, which is said to be the most Afrikaans 
country in the world.
I know that you are all experts in your various fields and therefore I 
do not wish to go into details regarding the subject of language law. I have 
seen the abstracts of the papers that will be presented during this con­
ference and they promise a most enlightening and rewarding conference.
In a country changing as fast as ours at present, it is essential that 
language issues be addressed at an early stage. We can learn from the 
mistakes and successes of the rest of the world and attempt to create a 
language policy that will be suitable and acceptable to all. This is one of 
the reasons why we are especially grateful to you for the contribution you 
will be making by your participation in this conference. Something of 
which South Africa is very proud, and of which you will hear more later, 
is the legal dictionary being compiled by the Committee for Legal Termi­
nology in African languages. I understand that there is nothing similar in 
South Africa or, as far as can be determined, in the Western world.
The equalisation of languages in South Africa will have a profound 
effect on the administration of central and local government. As far as I 
can see, the accepted principle that it is a person's right to be addressed in 
his own language by the state will mean that local government, among 
other things, will most probably have to employ translators who will be 
able to translate documentation into any of the 11 languages spoken in this 
country.
Ter afsluiting wil ek graag in my eie moedertaal 'n paar woorde se, 
want ek vemeem dat daar wel besoekers is wat Afrikaans kan verstaan. 
Ek wens u 'n aangename en konstruktiewe konferensie toe, want ek weet 
dat die resultate van u beraadslagings tot voordeel van ons land in sy 
geheel sal strek. Geniet ook gedurende u vrye tyd al die besienswaardig- 
hede wat Pretoria u kan bied!
I wish you all a pleasant stay in our dty.
4
The importance of the 
conference theme: 
language and equality'
Joseph-G. Turi 
Secretary-General of the International 
Academy of Language Law
INTRODUCTION
The International Academy of Language Law is very proud to be associ­
ated with the Human Sciences Research Council and the University of 
Pretoria in the organisation of the Third International Conference on 
Language and Law.
The theme of the conference, 'language and equality', is a very im­
portant subject (and not only from the linguistic point of view) and I am 
very happy that this subject is discussed at this venue.
Major language legislation in the area of language policy is evidence, 
within certain political contexts, of contacts, conflicts and inequalities 
among languages used within the same territory. Objectively or apparent­
ly, these languages coexist uneasily in a dominant-dominated relation­
ship, thereby leading to a situation of linguistic majorities and minorities.
The fundamental goal of all language legislation is to resolve, in one 
way or another, the linguistic problems arising from those linguistic con­
tacts, conflicts and inequalities, by legally determining and establishing 
the status and use of the languages in question.
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Preference is given to the protection, defence or promotion of one or 
several designated languages through legal language obligations and 
language rights drawn up for that purpose.
Canadian language legislation (the Official Languages Act) is an 
example of official legislation that applies language obligations and lan­
guage rights to two designated languages, English and French.1 Quebec's 
language legislation (the Charter of the French Language) is an example 
of exhaustive legislation that applies, in a different way, language obliga­
tions and language rights to French, to a few more or less designated 
languages and to other languages that are not designated.2
Increasing legal intervention in language policy gave birth, or recog­
nition, to a new legal science, comparative language law. Comparative 
language law is the study of language law throughout the world (as well 
as the language of law and the relation between law and language). To the 
extent that language, which is the main tool of the law, becomes both the 
object and the subject of law, language law becomes metajuridical law. To 
the extent that comparative language law recognises and enshrines lan­
guage rights, albeit sometimes rather timidly and implicitly, it becomes 
futuristic law, since it builds on historical roots. The recognition and 
implementation of language rights are based on two fundamental princi­
ples: the principle of the dignity of all languages and the principle of the 
equality of all languages. But language equality does not mean language 
uniformity. The tower of Babel is the manifestation of individual and 
collective cultural differences among people. As far as the language law 
takes into account this human reality, it is remarkable, since the growing 
recognition or historical enshrinement, in time and space, of language 
rights promotes the cultural right to be different, which is a promise of 
creativity for individuals and families, as well as for societies, nations and 
the international community.
As we have said, if today there is an increasing quantity of major 
language legislation in evidence, it is because fundamentally, within cer­
tain political contexts, there are contacts, conflicts and inequalities among 
languages used in the same given territory. Thus objectively or apparently, 
in a dominant-dominated relationship these languages coexist uneasily, 
thereby leading to a situation of linguistic majorities and minorities. How­
ever, it must be stated that the reality of these concepts of linguistic 
majority and minority is historical.
One need only think of Finland and Quebec, where for a long time the 
Swedes and the English, who were statistically the linguistic minorities,
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were to all intents and purposes the local linguistic majorities, which is no 
longer the case today, however.3
TYPES OF LANGUAGE LEGISLATION
Language legislation is divided into two categories, depending on its field 
of application: legislation which deals with the official usage of languages 
and that which deals with their non-official usage. Needless to say, there 
are grey areas in this classification.
Language legislation can also be divided into four categories, de­
pending on its function; it can be official, normalising, standardising or 
liberal. Legislation that fills all these functions is exhaustive language 
legislation, while other language legislation is non-exhaustive.
'Official language legislation' is legislation intended to make one or 
more designated, or more or less identifiable, languages official in the 
domains of legislation, justice, public administration and education. De­
pending on the circumstances, one of two principles is applied: linguistic 
territoriality (basically, the obligation or right to use one or more desig­
nated languages within a given territory) or linguistic personality (basi­
cally, the obligation or the right to use one's own language or any 
language). As such, making one or more designated languages official 
does not necessarily or automatically entail major legal consequences.
We call 'official language legislation' that legislation intended to make 
one or more designated languages official in the domain of legislation, 
justice, public administration and education. One or more designated 
languages can be made official in different ways: by formally designating 
them official languages or national languages, or by designating them 'the 
language' or 'the languages' in certain official domains or by granting 
them superior legal status in comparison to other languages, by declaring, 
for example, that only certain official texts written in these languages are 
'authentic', as in Cameroon.4 In South Africa there are eleven important or 
principal languages, but only two are official, English and Afrikaans. In 
certain regional constitutions, such as the Basque and Catalan constitu­
tions, Basque and Castillian on one hand and Catalonian and Castillian on 
the other are declared to be official languages. However, Basque is de­
clared Basque's 'own' language, while Catalonian is declared the 'special' 
language of Catalonia.5 Some countries, such as Ireland and Malta, make 
a distinction between the national language (Irish and Maltese) and the 
official language (English).6
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In other countries, such as Algeria on the one hand and Pakistan, 
India and Malaysia on the other hand, French and English are, respective­
ly, provisional official languages. The Philippine constitution makes pro­
vision, inter alia, for the development of a common national language, 
called 'Filipino'.
Knowledge of the official or national language is an important re­
quirement in certain situations. In Malaysia to become a registered citizen, 
an elementary knowledge of Malay is needed, but to become a naturalised 
Malaysian citizen an adequate knowledge of Malay is required. In Brazil, 
primary education is given only in Portuguese. In Norway certain highly 
placed officials must know Norwegian. In Spain, all Spaniards are obliged 
to know Spanish.7
As such, making one or more designated languages official does not 
necessarily entail major legal consequences. The legal sense and scope of 
the idea of an official language will depend on the effective legal treatment 
accorded the language concerned. In certain instances, to make one or 
more designated languages official in a given political context is only 
declaratory by nature, and consequently non-executory, and therefore has 
nothing more than a psychological impact, which should not be ignored, 
however.
The legal sense and scope of officialising a language depends on the 
effective legal treatment accorded to that language (for instance, when the 
law states that only official texts, or only certain official texts, are 'authen­
tic' so that they prevail, legally, over texts in one or more other languages).
'Normalising language legislation' is legislation which seeks to estab­
lish one or more designated languages as normal, usual or common 
languages, in the unofficial domains of labour, communications, culture, 
commerce and business.
'Standardising language legislation' is legislation designed to make 
one or more designated languages respect certain language standards in 
very specific and clearly defined domains, usually official or highly tech­
nical.
'Liberal language legislation' is legislation designed to enshrine legal 
recognition of language rights implicitly or explicitly, in one way or 
another. But language law, viewed objectively (as legal rules on language), 
make a distinction in language rights, which are subjective so that they 
belong to any person, between the right to 'a' language (the right to use 
one or more designated languages in various domains, especially in offi­
cial domains) and the right to 'the' language (the right to use any language
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in various domains, particularly in unofficial domains). These language 
rights, based respectively on the principle of territoriality and the principle 
of personality, are both individual and collective. Moreover, if language 
rights are also collective rights, they can belong in some cases to artificial 
persons (e.g. corporations) as well as to natural persons. After all, a human 
being is not only an individual but also a 'political animal', that is, a person 
living in a variety of social organisations.
COMPARATIVE LANGUAGE LAW
Language legislation never obliges anyone to use one or more languages 
in absolute terms. The obligation stands only to the extent that a legal act 
or fact covered by language legislation is or must be accomplished. For 
example, the obligation to use one or more languages on product labels 
stands only if, in non-linguistic legislation, there is an obligation to put 
labels on products.
Moreover, it is the written form (the language as medium) and not the 
written linguistic content (the language as message) that is usually 
targeted by legal rules dealing explicitly with language. Both linguistic 
content and linguistic form can be the object of legislation that generally is 
not explicitly linguistic, such as the Quebec Civil Code, the Charter of 
Human Rights, or the Consumer Protection Act.
Generally speaking, linguistic terms and expressions or linguistic 
concepts (mother tongue, for instance) are the focus of language legisla­
tion only to the extent that they are formally understandable, intelligible, 
translatable, usable or identifiable, in one way or another, or have some 
meaning in a given language.
For example, section 58 of Quebec's Charter of the French Language 
states that, allowing for exceptions, public signs must be solely in French. 
Therefore, if a word is posted and it is understandable in French, it is 
legally a French word. In this case, the public sign is legal (for instance, 
'ouvert'). In other respects, if a word is posted and it is not understandable 
in French, it is not legally a French word only if it has some meaning in 
another specific language and it is translatable into French. In this case, the 
public sign is illegal (for instance, 'open').
With regard to the concept of 'mother tongue', from a legal point of 
view, in the Forget case of 1988 the Supreme Court of Canada declared that 
'The concept of language is not limited to the mother-tongue but also 
includes the language of use or habitual communication ... there is no 
reason to adopt a narrow interpretation which does not take into account
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the possibility that the mother-tongue and the language of use may dif­
fer'.®
In principle, language legislation is aimed at the speakers of a lan­
guage (as consumers or users) rather than at the language itself (as an 
integral part of the cultural heritage of a nation) unless that legislation is 
clearly a public policy law (a public policy law is any law comprising legal 
standards so fundamental and essential, individually and collectively, in 
the interests of the community, that they become imperative or prohibitive 
in absolute terms so that they cannot be avoided in any way).
Quebec's Court of Appeal in the Miriam case (22 March 1984), Que­
bec's High Court in the Gagnon case (15 December 1986) and the French 
courts, in a great many decisions, including the Steiner case (Paris Court 
of Appeal, 27 November 1985) all confirm the essential points in the 
above?*
In the Miriam case, Quebec's Court of Appeal, in an obiter dictum 
(something said by a judge while giving judgment that was not essential 
to the decision in the case and therefore creating no binding precedent in 
itself), concluded that section 89 of Bill 101 (which, allowing for excep­
tions, permits the generalised use of both French and another language) 
and the Preamble of the Charter (in which it says that the Act must be 
enforced in a 'spirit of justice and open-mindedness') enshrined, for all 
practical purposes, the principle of linguistic freedom in Quebec.
In the Gagnon case, Quebec's High Court recognised as French the 
apparently English term 'office', used instead of the French word 'recep­
tion', because it was an expression peculiar to Quebec, not forbidden by 
the law, and understood in Quebec.
In the Steiner case, in a decision rendered on 27 November 1985, the 
Cour d'appel de Paris confirmed the judgment handed down by the Tribunal 
de Police de Paris on 1 December 1984, recognising as French the word 
'show', 'because it is found in all good French dictionaries and is easily 
understood by all, as well as the word showroom since there is no French 
translation of the expression and it would be inquisitional and abusive to 
enforce the use of the term halle or salle d'exposition' (translation).
Thus, anything that is linguistically 'neutral' is not generally targeted 
by language legislation, as can be seen, among others, with section 20 of 
the Quebec's Regulation respecting the language of commerce and busi­
ness.10 Section 20 of the above Regulation states that: 'Any inscription, any 
sign or poster, and any commercial advertising may be presented by
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pictographs, by figures, by any artificial combination of letters, syllables 
or figures, or by initials.'
While the presence of a language or the 'quantity' of its usage can be 
the object of exhaustive language legislation, language 'quality' or correct 
usage belongs to the realm of example and persuasion where language 
usage is unofficial, and to the schools and government where language 
usage is official.
Moreover, it should not be believed nor should the impression be 
given that language 'quality' is a recent phenomenon or problem. The 
ancient Greeks spent much time quibbling over the benefits or detriments 
of 'analogy' understood as an almost religious respect for the rules of 
grammar and of linguistic tradition and of 'anomaly' seen as a synonym 
for linguistic freedom and creativity. Furthermore, the modem Greeks had 
the same discussions some years ago, in 1952, when they drafted their new 
constitution. That is the reason why section 107 of the Greek constitution 
of 1952 stated that 'the official language of the country is the language in 
which the Constitution is written'. The Greek language could not be 
named, because the Greek language was not universally understood in the 
same way. Furthermore, that section prohibited any attempt to corrupt the 
official language!
The same situation applies with the Swiss constitution. Section 116 of 
that constitution states that French, Italian and German are the official 
languages of the Swiss Confederation. But which German language, the 
German of Germany or of Switzerland?11
The problem of the understandability or intelligibility of a legal text 
is also important: the State of New York has made two consumer protec­
tion laws which enact that some contracts must be written in 'under­
standable' or 'plain' language.12
Legal rules in linguistic matters are less severe than grammatical 
rules. There are four fundamental reasons for this: first, the best laws are 
those that legislate the least, particularly in the unofficial usage of lan­
guages; second, language, as an individual and collective way of express­
ion and communication, is an essential cultural phenomenon, in principle 
difficult to appropriate and define legally; third, legal rules, like sodoling- 
uistic rules, are only applied and applicable if they respect local custom 
and usage and the behaviour of reasonable people (who are not necessar­
ily linguistic paragons) whereas grammatical rules are based on the 
teacher-pupil relationship; fourth, criminal sanctions (fines or imprison­
ment) and dvil sanctions (damages, partial or total illegality), being gener­
11
ally harsher than possible language sanctions (low marks, loss of social 
prestige or loss of clients), which are the legal sanctions in the language 
field, are usually limited to low and symbolic fines or damages.
Jurists are therefore rather prudent when dealing with language 
policy, and rather reticent when interpreting language legislation exclu­
sively as public policy law.
Since the legal sanctions of a public policy law are formidable (partial 
or total illegality, for instance), many jurists, especially Quebec's jurists, 
prefer not to think of language laws as being exclusively public policy 
laws, except when their legal context is clearly in favour of such an 
interpretation, as it could be in the official usage of languages.
In the Sutton case (23 February 1983), and the Miriam case (22 March 
1984), the Montreal Court of the Sessions of the Peace and Quebec's Court 
of Appeal respectively declared that in certain given situations, Quebec's 
language legislation applies to francophones only if they explicitly request 
to be served in French. It was thus concluded that francophones can 
renounce their language rights, which evidently suggests that the legisla­
tion in question is not deemed to be a public policy law.11
True, the French Cour de cassation declared implicitly, in the France 
Quick case (20 October 1986) that French language legislation was a public 
policy law. In the France Quick case, the Cour d'appel de Paris, in its decision 
of 14 December 1986, acquitted a firm accused of using the terms 'giant', 
'big', 'coffee-drink', 'bigcheese', 'fishburger', 'hamburger', 'cheesebur­
ger', and 'milkshake', on the grounds that the terms and expressions were 
either fanciful or understood by the French consumers.14 France's Cour de 
cassation quashed this judgment, arguing that French language legislation 
protected the French language rather than francophones, without entering 
into much detail.1^
However, that did not prevent the Cour d'appel de Versailles, in the 
France Quick case (24 June 1987) from considering terms such as 'spaghet­
tis' and 'plum-pudding' to be, for all practical purposes, French terms, that 
is, to be in keeping with such legislation, because they were 'known to the 
general public'.16
The fundamental goal of this legislation, then, is to protect both 
francophones and the French language. A francophone is anyone whose 
language of use is French, that is, from a legal point of view, any person 
who can speak and understand French, in an ordinary and relatively 
intelligible manner.
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In the MacDonald case (1 May 1986) and the Ford case (15 December 
1988), the Supreme Court of Canada recognised and enshrined, to all 
intents and purposes, the distinction between the right to 'a' language 
(principal right, foreseen as such in the Canadian constitution, explicitly 
historical owing to the historical background of the country, in the do­
mains of the official usage of languages) and the right to 'the' language 
(accessory right, not explicitly foreseen as such in the Canadian constitu­
tion, implicitly fundamental, in the domains of the unofficial usage of 
languages). The Court also recognised and enshrined the main differences 
between the official and the unofficial usage of languages. In the Ford case, 
the Supreme Court of Canada declared that 'Language is so intimately 
related to the form and content of expression that there cannot be true 
freedom of expression by means of language if one is prohibited from 
using the language of one's choice.'17
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the right to 'the' lan­
guage is implicitly an integral part of the explicit fundamental right of 
freedom of speech. Moreover, in the Irving Toy case (27 April 1989), the 
Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that artificial persons also held 
certain language rights, such as the implicit right to 'the' language in the 
unofficial domain of commerce. In this decision, the Supreme Court gave 
also this definition of freedom of speech: 'Indeed, freedom of expression 
ensures that we can convey our thoughts and feelings in non-violent ways 
without fear of censure.' For the Court, freedom of speech means, in 
principle, any content (any message, including commercial messages) in 
any form (any medium and therefore any language), except violence.18
A relatively complete study carried out for the United Nations in 
1979, the Capotorti Report, indicates that, although the use of languages 
other than the official language(s) in the domains of official usage is 
restricted or forbidden in various parts of the world, the use of languages 
in the domains of unofficial usage is generally not restricted or forbid­
den.19 We arrived at the same conclusion in 1977, when we made an 
analysis of the constitutional clauses of 147 states in the field of lan­
guages.20 Moreover, we should not forget that in the United States, 17 
states (including California and Florida) passed language legislation enac­
ting that English language is their official language in the official usage of 
languages.
It must be pointed out, however, that, in some cases, Turkey prohibits 
the use of certain languages, languages other than the first official lan­
guage of each country which recognises the Republic of Turkey.21 The 
prohibitory measures contravene, prima facie section 27 of the International
13
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of 1966, which recognises the right 
of members of linguistic minorities to use their own language.22
THE LEGAL SENSE AND SCOPE OF THE EXPRESSION 'LANGUAGE 
RIGHTS'
Let us briefly examine certain decisions relating to language rights in 
Belgium,23 the two judgments of the Appeal Court of Quebec in the Devitie 
and Ford cases of 22 December 1986,24 as well as the six judgments of the 
Supreme Court of Canada on 13 June 1985 in the case pertaining to 
language rights in Manitoba, on 1 May 1986 in the MacDonald case and the 
Societi des Acadiens case on 25 February 1988, in the Mercure case on 15 
December 1988, in the Brown's Shoe case on 15 December 1988, and in the 
Irving Toy case on 27 April 1989.25
In the European decision of 1968, the Court did state that the right to 
language was not a fundamental right. However, in this decision, it was a 
question of official use of languages and more precisely of the right to 
language in the domain of education. In the decisions in Quebec, the 
Appeal Court of Quebec declared that the right to language was fun­
damental and did not form an implicit and integral part of freedom of 
speech which, in its turn, is explicitly recognised and protected in Canada 
and in Quebec as a fundamental right.26 The Supreme Court of Canada 
unanimously confirmed the decision in the Brown's Shoe case. In this 
judgment, as we have said before, the Court declared that 'language is so 
intimately linked to the form and the content of expression that there can 
be no real freedom of linguistic expression if one is forbidden to use the 
language of one's choice'. In the Irving Toy case, the Supreme Court said: 
'Indeed, freedom of speech ensures that we can convey our thoughts and 
feelings, in non-violent ways without fear of censure.' For the Court, 
freedom of speech means, in principle at least, any content (and therefore 
includes commercial content) in any form (and therefore any language). 
In these four Canadian decisions, it was a question of the non-official use 
of language, and more precisely language rights in the fields of advertising 
and commercial signposting as well as in the field of social relations.
It seems that these judgments make us understand better that the 
right to language means, to all intents and purposes, the right to 'a' 
language (one or more designated languages) in the domain of official 
usage of languages. Under the circumstances, this is difficult to under­
stand because a state cannot usefully employ the languages of all its 
citizens and may consequently strictly limit itself to practising only its
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language or languages that is/are official, or certain languages, in one way 
or another. So, to take an example, by virtue of article 38 of the Special 
Statute of Val of Aosta of 1948, the official texts of this autonomous Italian 
region may be drafted in Italian or in French, except for legal decisions 
which can be written only in Italian.27
The right to 'a' language (one or more designated languages) in the 
official usage of languages is in itself not necessarily a fundamental right. 
This arises from the MacDonald decision in the Supreme Court of Canada, 
which concluded that the right to use French and English in the Canadian 
legal domain, in compliance with the written clauses of the Canadian 
constitution, does not, in itself, necessarily constitute a fundamental right, 
but rather an historical right. Incidentally, according to the Supreme Court, 
the right to be understood in any language in a Canadian legal case would 
be a fundamental right arising out of common law and as such could not 
even be the object of a derogatory clause on the part of the Federal 
Parliament or of provincial legislation, because 'it is practically inconceiv­
able that they would completely suppress' this type of fundamental right.
In the dismissal handed down in the language rights in the Manitoba 
case, the Supreme Court of Canada declared: 'The importance of rights in 
respect of language is based on the essential role that language plays in the 
existence, the development and the dignity of the human being. It is by 
means of language that we can formulate our ideas, and give structure and 
order to the world around us. Language constitutes the bridge between 
isolation and collectivity, that allows human beings to delimit the rights 
and obligations that they have towards one another, and thus, to live in 
society.' Moreover, in the Societe des Acadiens case, the Supreme Court of 
Canada decided that 'language rights arise out of fundamental rights', 
while in the Mercure case, it declared that 'it is with difficulty that one can 
deny that language is profoundly anchored in the human condition. It is 
hardly surprising that language rights constitute a well known genre of 
personal rights' and that 'rights concerning the French and English lan­
guages are essential to the viability of the nation'.2*
Therefore one must distinguish between the right to 'a' language, a 
right that is possibly fundamental and historical by nature, and the right 
to 'the' language, a right that is necessarily fundamental and universal by 
nature.
In principle, the right to 'a' language (one or more designated lan­
guages) and the right to 'the' language, to the extent that it is recognised, 
should include in the official usage of the languages not only the right to 
express oneself and to communicate, but also the right to demand to
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understand, to be understood and served in the language or languages 
used.
Moreover, in the non-official usage of languages, even though the 
right to express oneself and to communicate in a given language should 
not be limited in principle, the right to demand to understand, to be 
understood and served in a given language should be practically limited 
in unilateral linguistic situations and recognised in certain conditions in 
bilateral or multilateral situations.
CONCLUSION
The right to 'the' language will become an effective fundamental right, like 
other fundamental rights, only to the extent that it is enshrined not simply 
in higher legal norms, but also in norms with mandatory provisions that 
identify as precisely as possible the holders and the beneficiaries of lan­
guage rights and language obligations, and the legal sanctions that accom­
pany them. Otherwise, the right to 'the' language will be but a theoretical 
fundamental right, like several fundamental rights, proclaimed in norms 
with directive provisions that cover language rights but have no real 
corresponding sanctions and obligations.
While the law inhabits a grey zone, and the best legislation is that 
which says the least, especially regarding unofficial usage of languages, 
the right to 'the' language (and therefore the right to be different) will have 
meaning, legally speaking, only if it is enshrined (above all for language 
minorities) in one way or another (particularly, in the official usage of 
languages), in norms with mandatory provisions, as the right to 'a' lan­
guage generally is.
As a historical right (that takes into account the historic background 
of each country), the right to 'a language deserves special treatment in 
certain political contexts, even if it is not in itself a fundamental right. As 
a fundamental right (right and freedom to which every person is entitled), 
the right to 'the' language, even if it enshrines the dignity of all languages, 
cannot be considered an absolute right under all circumstances. A hier­
archy exists that must take into account, in ways which are different but 
not legally discriminatory, the historical and fundamental linguistic im­
perative of the nations and individuals concerned, including the impera­
tive of reestablishing a definite equality between several languages 
coexisting in a given political context.29
By ruling, in section 89 for instance, that 'Where this act does not 
require the use of the official language [French] exclusively, the official
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language and another language may be used together', Quebec's Charter 
of the French language recognises and enshrines the right to 'a' language 
and the right to 'the' language by creating an interesting hierarchical 
solution between them in the field of language policy.30
It is very difficult to study the linguistic policies of modem states from 
a strictly legal point of view, because we do not always have at our 
disposal all of the pertinent legal clauses. In fact, an exclusively constitu­
tional study, or a study of certain legal texts of a constitutional nature, is 
not adequate to enable one to arrive at absolutely precise legal conclusions.
The ideal would be to have at our disposal constitutional clauses, 
ordinary legal clauses, the statutes, the legal and administrative judg­
ments as well as the relevant doctrinal references in respect of linguistic 
matters.
In reality this is possible only for certain states or for certain member 
states, such as Canada and Quebec. This is why the juridical-linguistic 
study of Canada and Quebec is so important and essential in order to 
properly understand and better site the legal hows and whys of any 
language policy.
Moreover, it is clear that language rights, and more specifically the 
right to language, are increasingly being recognised as fundamental rights, 
but not yet in a satisfactory way. Article 27 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, which came into force in 1976, is a 
good start in this respect. This article recognises in principle the right of 
members of minority language groups to use their language.
This is why we believe that the time has come for competent interna­
tional bodies, such as the United Nations, Unesco, the Council of Europe 
and leading private institutions, to pay serious attention to the phenomena 
and the problems relating to these, so that a universal declaration of 
language rights can be drafted and ultimately approved and adopted by 
all states concerned. In respect of the language policy of a country, this 
declaration must take account of the domain of official usage of languages 
and the domain of non-official usage and of the distinction to be made 
between historical language rights and fundamental language rights on 
the one hand and between linguistic minorities and majorities on the other 
hand.
Certain annoying trends must be avoided, such as the insistence on 
protection for linguistic majorities or the insistence that only linguistic 
minorities be protected. Obviously, there must be agreement on what is 
meant by 'linguistic majority' and 'linguistic minority'. Above all, it must
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not be forgotten that the tower of Babel is a permanent reality of the 
human condition, both entrancing and confusing. This means that a lin­
guistic policy should also take into account this reality and avoid excessive 
language control.
At the beginning of this paper we said that language rights are based 
on two fundamental principles, the principle of the dignity of all lan­
guages and the principle of equality of all languages. These two principles 
are interdependent. Therefore, any kind of linguistic discrimination or 
linguistic hierarchy should be inacceptable in itself.
However, not all languages are equal from a historical point of view. 
There are dominant and dominated languages, leading to situations of 
linguistic majorities and minorities and thus creating negative situations 
in linguistic and non-linguistic fields, language equality, we said, does not 
mean language uniformity. Nor does language equality among thousands 
of languages and dialects in the world mean absolute equality among 
them. It means that all languages, precisely because they are vitally differ­
ent, must live and let others live equally in different ways. It is the only 
way to avoid the 'languages war'. And if we want to achieve 'linguistic 
peace', we must do all we can, legally and politically, to make linguistic 
peace a true reality. Linguistic peace is possible and desirable in the 
interest of everyone. Linguistic peace will be a source of extraordinary 
cultural creativity. So we must proclaim solemnly the principle of equality 
and the principle of the dignity of all human languages. We must avoid 
any kind of unacceptable linguistic hegemony.
The language situation in South Africa is very peculiar because of the 
presence of 11 important or principal languages. I am sure South Africans 
will find the best suitable solutions concerning their language problems, 
which are indeed very important and serious. If the principles of dignity 
and equality among languages are respected, the solutions South Africans 
will realise could be a remarkable example for all the concerned countries.
The distinctions we make between official usage and non-official 
usage of languages, between official domains (legislation, justice, public 
administration and instruction) and non-official domains (culture, com ­
munications, business and commerce, and labour), between human lan­
guage rights of historical nature and human language rights of universal 
nature, between official and national languages, between central, regional 
and local languages could help to find the best equitable solutions in the 
language field. All these distinctions mean that the legal treatment of each 
of these distinctions can be or must be different, according to circumstan­
ces.
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The International Academy of Language Law is at the entire disposal 
of all concerned people in South Africa to help to find, from a technical 
point of view, the most equitable solutions to the language problems of this 
country.
The Third International Conference of Language and Law, 'Language 
and equality', places in a prominent position the importance and the 
urgency to recognise and enshrine the principles of dignity and equality 
of all human languages. From this point of view, we do hope it will create 
significant results.
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LANGUAGE AND LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Language, law and equality 
in South Africa: a theoretical 
and practical challenge
Dawid van Wyk
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INTRODUCTION
This is an international conference on language and law, with a rider of 
equality. This first session is entitled 'language and law: theory and prac­
tice'. I took the liberty of focusing the title by adding 'equality' and 'South 
Africa'. Because a number of rather specific papers on aspects of language 
and law in a South African context will follow, I have allowed myself the 
further freedom of being somewhat general in my approach. Broadly 
speaking, I propose to make a number of brief observations about lan­
guage, law and equality in South Africa, past and present; this will be 
followed by some random theoretical and practical considerations, and a 
conclusion.
Language and equality
Language and equality have never been comfortable bedfellows in South 
Africa. Granted, the law since 1910 has tried to force parts of both into each 
other's arms when first Dutch (later Afrikaans) and English were given 
'equal freedom, rights and privileges' by the Union of South Africa Act 
1909.1 In practice, however, the relationship had always been uneasy. It is 
trite but true that the language clauses in successive South African con­
stitutions mirrored political attitudes and ideologies. In more or less his­
torical succession, these were colonialism, nationalism and apartheid.
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English and Afrikaans were on the scene; African languages, like African 
politics, were somewhere out there, unimportant, informal, somehow 
wished away until the grand scheme of institutionalised apartheid 
allowed them to surface in the form of 'official' languages for homelands. 
Generations of white Afrikaner children grew up on the 'miracle' of 
Afrikaans and on their duty to ensure that it achieves its rightful place in 
South Africa, equal to English in all spheres of life.
Official 'bilingualism' became so ingrained in the hearts and minds of 
white South Africans that the thought of any permanent inhabitant of this 
country not being able to understand either Afrikaans or English became 
virtually inconceivable. To give an example: an African law student writes 
at the end of an assignment that he cannot complete certain sections. The 
reason is his inadequate knowledge of Afrikaans, the language of some of 
the prescribed materials. The (white) marker's comment is telling: 'This is 
no excuse; we live in a bilingual country.' Formally the reply was correct. 
To be admitted to legal practice in South Africa, a student has to satisfy the 
court that he or she has passed prescribed university courses in Afrikaans 
and English. Real proficiency, however, is seldom tested. Likewise, the 
question is hardly asked -  or answered -  whether a person really needs a 
knowledge of Afrikaans to practise law in South Africa. Lest I should be 
misunderstood: it is not Afrikaans that is in the dock, as it were, but the 
efficacy of prescriptive language legislation.
In the absence of a bill of fundamental rights, guaranteeing equality, 
it should not come as a surprise that South African lawyers have not really 
interested themselves in the language question beyond the narrow con­
fines of resolving conflicts in documents which were drawn in the official 
languages. A search through the textbooks and the law journals produces 
little of significance on the broader issue of language and the law in South 
Africa, let alone in the context of equality. Some six years ago a visiting 
German professor delivered a paper on 'Literature, language and the law*5 
at the University of Pretoria, but his emphasis was more on language as 
the basis of law. In 1991 Bronstein and Hersch of the University of the 
Witwatersrand came closer to what I regard as the burning issue with an 
address on 'Teaching law as a second language in a second language'.3 
Their poignant observation goes to the heart of the language problem in 
the new South Africa:4 'There is no p oin t... in admitting students unless 
they are given a real chance to graduate.'5
The law reports in South Africa contain a sufficient number of auth­
oritative judgments on how to handle the technicalities of conflicts be­
tween texts in the current official languages. However, apart from a recent
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judgment on the use of Afrikaans and English in court proceedings,6 the 
silence in our courts on the broader issue of language rights is a reflection 
of the esoteric nature of that notion in South African law.
From a legal point of view, equality of (the official) languages through 
the years has been little more than a statutory injunction, meticulously and 
successfully observed in a vast body of official documentation, ranging 
from Acts of Parliament to correction notices in the Government Gazette. 
This should not be taken as suggesting that attempts had not made by the 
authorities -  especially since 1948 -  to translate this law of linguistic 
equality into policy and action beyond paper. Especially in regard to the 
furtherance of Afrikaans, though, these efforts met with less than enthusi­
astic support. In fact, if Neville Alexander is correct in his assessment,7 the 
Soweto uprising of 1976 highlighted the extent to which rejection of 
Afrikaans had become a symbol of resistance to apartheid with its inherent 
nature of inequality and discrimination.
The good news is that, like everything else, the language issue has 
also landed in the crucible of change created by recent political events in 
South Africa. The prospects of democracy fanned the simmering debates 
on language in the constitution.8 There are two obvious sides to the matter: 
on the one hand individual equality without distinction as to language;9 
on the other the question of the status of a particular language in terms of 
the law. The South African Law Commission addressed both issues in its 
Interim report on group and human rights10 and its Report on constitutional 
models.u The African National Congress made brief proposals in its A bill 
of rights for a new South Africa n  The National Party also fired a shot in its 
Constitutional rule in a participatory democracy13 by suggesting that 'com­
munities are guaranteed self-determination in regard to ... language', 
among other things.
Language and the individual
It would appear that the Law Commission and the African National 
Congress agree on the issue of language and individual equality. In its 
proposed equality clause14 the ANC is explicit on this score:
No individual or group shall receive privileges or be subjected to 
discrimination, domination or abuse on the grounds of race, colour, 
language, gender, creed, political or other opinion, birth or other 
status.
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The Law Commission, on the other hand, somewhat clouded its 
initial and unequivocal commitment to the same principle. In its Working 
Paper' 5 it is stated clearly:
The right to human dignity and equality before the law, which means 
that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race, colour, 
language, sex, religion, ethnic origin, social class, birth, political or 
other views or any disability or natural characteristic ...
However, in its subsequent Interim report on group and human rights'6 
this clause is reworded as follows without any direct reference to the 
question of language in the preceding discussion:
Everyone has the right to equality before the law, which means, inter 
alia, that save as permitted in this article, no legislation or executive 
or administrative act shall directly or indirectly favour or prejudice 
any person on the grounds of his or her race, colour, sex, religion, 
ethnic origin, social class, birth, political and other views or disabil­
ities or other natural characteristics.
Unless I have missed the explanation for the omission of language in 
the reworded article -  which is not impossible in view of the volume of the 
report and the absence of an index of words -  it is unclear whether the 
omission was deliberate or by mistake. An argument for the latter is 
supported by the lack of reference to language in the discussion and by the 
fact that in the summary of its recommendations the following occurs:17
As wide a spectrum as possible of civil and political rights is covered. 
Of particular importance is the prohibition of the state's favouring or 
prejudicing any person on the ground of race, colour, language [own 
italics], sex, religion, ethnic origin, social class, birth, political or other 
views or disabilities or other natural characteristics.
The argument for a deliberate omission of language in the equality 
clause could be based on the fact that the word was also left out of 
article 3(1) at the end of the Commission's report where the proposed bill 
of rights is reproduced in full.18 This is by no means conclusive, given 
modem word processing technology which allows parts of texts to be 
moved and copied. A more convincing reason would be that the proposed 
article 1819 deals with equality in respect of language by using language 
which echoes the general equality provision:
Everyone has the right, individually or in community with others, 
freely to practise the religion and culture and freely to use the lan­
guage of his or her choice, so that there shall be no prejudice to or
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favouring of anyone on account of his or her religion, culture or 
language.
Without going into technical interpretations, it is maintained that in 
order to avoid any doubt, the better approach would be to include 
language in the general equality clause as well.
The views of the Law Commission and the ANC diverge in respect of 
the protection of language(s). The ANC proposes2^  that eleven languages 
be declared 'the languages of South Africa'. It would further enjoin the 
state to 'act positively to further the development of these languages, 
especially in education, literature and the media, and to prevent the use of 
any language or languages for the purpose of domination or division'.21 
The state would have the further task of promoting respect for all the 
languages spoken in South Africa.22 When it is reasonable, one or more of 
the eleven languages could be designated for 'defined' purposes at the 
national or regional level.2*1 It is significant that the adjectives 'official' and 
'national' are carefully avoided in the ANC proposals.
The Law Commission criticises these proposals for being too vague 
and summary, and for giving the governing party under a new constitu­
tion the discretion to decide which language(s) should be official. It recom­
mends that the matter be dealt with in a separate chapter of the 
constitution.24 The Commission may have been somewhat harsh in its 
criticism. Apart from a brief introduction, the ANC's document does not 
contain any reasoned exposition of the contents of its bill. Its language 
clauses are far too nuanced not to have been debated extensively, a glimpse 
of which may be gleaned from Albie Sachs's Protecting human rights in a 
new South Africa.
The Commission's own views are found in chapter 11 of its Report on 
Constitutional Models. The 54-page chapter contains a wealth of informa­
tion on the way in which languages are dealt with in constitutions. The 
Commission eventually identifies nine 'practical' options for a future 
South African constitution.26 The Commission itself does not express a 
preference for any of the options, however.
The role of language in the state
The consequences of including language in the equality clause, and spec­
ifying languages in the constitution (in whatever form) are potentially 
enormous. Leaving them out, however, could lead to disastrous results, 
especially in a country where ethnic awareness, regardless of the correct­
ness of the reasons, is present in some form or other. Even in the United
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States of America, where it was said2 that 'English is the pot in which the 
melting takes place', the last decade has seen a proliferation of groups 
advocating the recognition of language rights.2* It is not altogether unsur­
prising that this movement came as a reaction to various attempts during 
the last number of decades to introduce English as the official American 
language. There are at least two significant sides to this development.
The first is that the language issue is linked to ethnicity. In the fairly 
recent words of two American authors:29
For ethnic groups ... a national language has important functions: it 
affirms the group's ethnic identity and provides an important bound­
ary between themselves and others. Because language has expressive 
as well as instrumental uses, it is also important as a vehicle for 
individual identity and intimate social relations within an ethnic 
group. Language use also functions as a political tool; it fashions 
in-group solidarity, as well as expressing relations of dominance and 
sub-ordination within the civic culture. Moreover, language, unlike 
national costume, is not a relic. Its ability to adapt to new situations 
enables it to become part of the vitality of an ethnic culture.
The second noteworthy aspect concerns equality. Vernon van Dyke, 
whose name is not unknown in South African political and constitutional 
circles, puts it concisely in a recent work:10
Problems about equal treatment are inevitable in communities where 
more than one language is spoken, above all when, as in the United 
States, one of the languages is dominant. To have equal opportunities 
in life, those who speak a minority language must learn English, 
which puts a burden on them that other do not share.
I have used the United States as point of reference for a specific 
reason. It is a classic instance of the tension between what Limage11 calls 
the monolingual hegemony of an industrialised nation and the upsurge of 
demands for equality of other languages. It would appear that in the 
United States, as elsewhere, a root concern is the effect of a diversity of 
languages on the unity of the nation.
This opens up a new hornet's nest of questions about the role of 
language in the state and the ability of the law to regulate that role in a way 
which is inherent to law, namely equal. The pitfalls in trying to argue the 
case are manifold. The first question is whether there are universal truths 
about the phenomenon of language(s) in the state. At first glance the reply 
would seem to be positive: the amount of conflict generated by linguistic 
disputes, for example, suggests that Tollefson12 has a point when he
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maintains -  with reference to the current crisis in Yugoslavia -  that 'the 
foundation for rights is power and that constant struggle is necessary to 
sustain language rights'. In a South African context it would not be too 
difficult to find one or more significant political factions subscribing to this 
thesis.33 The point is that there is something inherently unequal about the 
notions of power and struggle.
On the face of it such an approach rules out, as an alternative to 
'struggle', tolerance of the intrinsic tension that goes with diversity or 
plurality. Struggle, more often than not, is destructive. Tolerance, on the 
other hand, may (in principle at least) lead to the creative management of 
the tensions caused by conflicting demands and aspirations.34
Tolerance is an accepted value of democracy. At the same time, it is 
one of the values for which democracies emerging before the 'new world 
order' of the last two or three years had not been noted. Within a constitu­
tional context it implies that the social and political consequences of the 
administration of diversity should be the fostering of a 'critical and open 
pluralism', instead of a segmentation and isolation of groups in a larger 
society.35 Such an approach, it is suggested, should lead to language being 
seen not in ideological terms as a tool of unification or separation, but in 
more practical terms of what is best understood at certain levels. This is 
another way of stating the difference between the 'ideological' perception 
of language as the bearer of a particular culture and language as a cultural 
phenomenon in itself.36
There will probably not be much resistance to the inclusion of lan­
guage in the equality clause of a future South African bill of rights. The 
same applies to the right of every individual to use his or her own 
language.
The more difficult issue to resolve will be that of specific languages in 
the constitution, whether in an official, national or merely nominal capac­
ity. There are positives and negatives involved. The following aspects will 
have to be considered:
• The make-up of South Africa's multilingual nature is such that every 
resident individual will have to know at least two languages. Since 
the political/ideological edge of the current system of official lan­
guages would be gone, encouragement to acquire as many languages 
as possible should not meet with opposition.
• The argument for a unifying language with a view to nation-building 
has been overtaken by events; as a result the acceptance of a particu­
lar language, such as English, as lingua franca, could in principle be
33
managed in a rational as opposed to an emotional way. The words of 
Tollefson^ should be a constant reminder, however, that 'human 
institutions may not yet be able to provide a social structure in which 
everyone can live their lives using their own language(s), but we 
should not deceive ourselves into thinking that second language 
acquisition [wat vir die meeste Suid-Afrikaners die geval met Engels 
is] guarantees equal economic opportunity, political participation, 
and justice'.
• The identification of the areas where proficiency in an 'official' lan­
guage matters should be undertaken and special affirmative action 
programmes developed to ensure that those who need a certain level 
of proficiency could be assisted to acquire the same. Useful com­
parative materials are available.
• Structural equality, that is 'a system for making decisions in which 
individuals who are affected by policies have a major role in making 
policies',^ and a commitment to democracy would be required to 
encourage altitudinal changes needed to solve the problems of in­
equality in a multilingual state. In the words of Braen. 'although the 
law relating to language clearly reflects the principle of equality, true 
equality is never achieved without profound attitudinal changes.'
• The tension between the equality clause of the constitution, and an 
'official/national' language provision (which seems inevitable in 
South Africa) should be handled in a pragmatic, as opposed to a 
dogmatic, way.
• The psychological impact of the 'resurgence of ethnic-minority na­
tionalism all over the world'40 and the attendant readiness to 
'struggle' for language rights should not be underestimated, espe­
cially during the period of transition.
• It will have to be accepted that in some cases the best compromise 
may be the one in which equal disadvantage overshadows the lack 
of any significant equal benefit. In discussing the Namibian policy of 
official English, Tollefson41 concludes: 'In a sense, English will 
equally disadvantage much of the population, unlike indigenous 
languages, which would grant privileges to entire groups.'
A participant in Codesa observed recently in passing that the lan­
guage issue will be one of the easier ones to solve as far as the constitution 
for a new South Africa is concerned. It can only be hoped that this was not 
too optimistic a view.
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